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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 04-3784
___________
VERONICA PHILLIPS
v.
RUPERTHA ANDREWS,
Appellant.
___________

On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands-Appellate Division
(D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-00096)
District Judge: The Honorable Raymond L. Finch, Chief Judge
District Judge: The Honorable Thomas K. Moore
Territorial Judge: The Honorable Rhys S. Hodge
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 19, 2005
Before: NYGAARD, RENDELL, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: April 28, 2005)

___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Appellee Veronica Phillips filed this action with the Territorial Court of the Virgin
Islands, alleging entitlement to damages incurred from Appellant Rupertha Andrews’
improper disbursement of insurance proceeds. The Territorial Court held that Andrews’
actions were proper based on the verbal grant of authority given by Phillips. The District
Court of the Virgin Islands reversed. Andrews argues on appeal that the District Court of
the Virgin Islands erred in its finding that she lacked authority and or agency to contract
and pay for the repairs to Phillips’ house. We will affirm.
I.
This appeal stems from an action for damages instituted by Appellee Veronica
Phillips against Appellant, a local real estate agent. Andrews assisted Phillips in finding
property on the island of St. Croix. Phillips executed a Special Power of Attorney which
was effective until closing. Before the closing, the property was damaged by a hurricane.
The seller, however, had insured the house and agreed to assign the insurance proceeds to
Phillips to compensate her for the damage to the property. Before she received the
insurance proceeds, Phillips executed a second Special Power of Attorney on December
29, 1995, authorizing Andrews to “receive any and all insurance proceeds/interests of
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mine.” On January 22, 1996, the insurance company issued its settlement check in the
amount of $14,081.75 and Andrews, as agent for Phillips, collected the proceeds.
Wrigby Archibald 1 testified that Phillips asked him to repair her house and told
him he would be paid by Andrews. He conceded that he never prepared an estimate,
never agreed on a price for the repairs, and never entered into a written agreement with
Phillips because he did not intend to do a “contract job” for her at a “fixed price.”
Archibald, a contractor for the last 25 to 30 years, conceded that this was not his regular
practice. He never billed Phillips for any of the work and he does not know what the
repairs actually cost nor could he produce any receipts. Phillips asserts that, although she
talked to Archibald about repairing her home, they did not reach an agreement.
Furthermore, Phillips asserts that when she returned to St. Croix the house was in the
same condition in which she had left it.
The record contains a letter from Andrews to Phillips which provides: “I followed
your instructions as requested of me by Janet2 to “DEPOSIT YOUR INSURANCE
CHECK, FOR REPAIRS TO YOUR PROPERTY IN MY ACCOUNT AND THEN
GIVE ALL OF THE MONEY TO MR. ARCHIBALD IN ORDER FOR HIM TO DO
THE REPAIRS.” However, Janet testified that she gave Andrews no such authority. In
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Mr. Archibald is Andrews’ brother.
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Janet Davis was Phillips’ friend who also worked in Andrews’ office.
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her April 4, 1996 letter to Phillips, Andrews outlined the disbursements to Archibald
totaling $14,081.75 as follows:
Feb. 29, 1996 - $2,500
March 6, 1996 - $3,000
March 12, 1996 - $2,500
March 15, 1996 - $ 600
March 22, 1996 - $2,500
March 22, 1996 - $ 500
March 25, 1996 - $2,481.75
The summary did not indicate the specific purpose of those payments. Furthermore, some
of those checks were written to Archibald and others were written to “Cash.”
II.
Phillips disputes that she ever orally extended authority to Andrews and she
asserts that Andrews only had authority to receive the insurance proceeds from the
insurance company. Andrews contends, however, that around the same time as the
written power of attorney was executed, Phillips gave her an additional oral grant of
authority to expend the insurance proceeds for the purpose of securing repairs to Phillips’
home.
The Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands denied Phillips’ requested relief,
finding that while the written power of attorney did not address Andrews’ authority to
apply the insurance proceeds to repair the home, there was an oral grant of authority. The
District Court of the Virgin Islands reversed the Territorial Court’s decision and held that
an oral authority granted contemporaneously with the written power of attorney could not
modify the written authority. We agree and will affirm.
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III.
An agency relationship is formed by the “manifestation of consent by one person
to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by
the other to so act.” R ESTATEMENT S ECOND OF A GENCY § 15 (1981). An agent’s
authority may be created “by written or spoken words or other conduct of the principal
which, reasonably interpreted, causes the agent to believe that the principal desires him so
to act on the principal’s account.” Id. at § 26 and cmt. 6. Where the agent’s authority is
conferred through a writing, the court must look to the form and content of that writing in
light of the circumstances, to ascertain whether the parties intended to constitute a
complete and final expression of their agreement. Id. § 48.
The parol evidence rule precludes using extrinsic evidence of prior or
contemporaneous agreements to extend or alter the authority granted in a writing. Id. at
cmt. b. We said that:
If [both an oral and written agreement] relate to the same subject matter,
and are so interrelated that both would be executed at the same time and in
the same contract, the scope of the . . . agreement must be taken to be
covered by the writing.
Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real Estate Equity and Mortgage Inv., 951 F.2d 1399,
1405 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991).
In this instance, Phillips executed a two-page power of attorney, which provided in
pertinent part:
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My agent shall have full power and authority to act on my behalf but only to
the extent permitted by this Special Power of Attorney. My agent’s powers
shall include the power to:
1. Receive any and all insurance proceeds/interest of mine in real (sic)
located at: plot No. 230 of Estate La Grange, West End Quarter, Frederiksted, St.
Croix, V.I.
The written agreement clearly addressed the precise subject matter contested here—the
scope of the agent’s authority with regard to handling Phillips’ insurance settlement—and
limited Andrews’ authority to that defined in the writing. The written power of attorney
was executed on December 29, 1995 and Andrews asserts that the purported oral grant of
authority was given during that same time period—sometime toward the end of
December. The subjects of both agreements are so closely related, and the relationship in
time is so close, that the scope of the written agreement must prevail. Moreover,
according to the parol evidence rule, we are precluded from considering the oral
evidence, since it alters the authority granted in the writing.
IV.
Therefore, the District Court correctly held that the trial court erred as a matter of
law by giving legal effect to a contemporaneous oral agreement significantly expanding
the scope of the agent’s authority which was otherwise expressly defined in a writing.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.

